North+Korea

I. The Issue: Nuclear Weapons As North Korea is a closed, secretive society and its weapons of mass destruction programs are clandestine, details regarding its nuclear weapons capabilities are difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, it seems clear that, before 1992, North Korea – formally the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—may have produced and retained enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons; it possibly has made one or two weapons using that material; and there are estimates of a greater North Korean nuclear capability. Also, North Korea is currently developing capabilities to produce additional weapons-grade plutonium and probably highly enriched uranium. In signing the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, the DPRK agreed to forego developing a nuclear weapons capability and to enter into a “safeguards” agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), giving the IAEA the right to inspect North Korean nuclear facilities for the purpose of verifying compliance with the NPT. In 1992, North Korea signed a safeguards agreement and submitted to IAEA inspections. However, discrepancies between North Korea’s declarations to the IAEA in 1992 and the agency’s findings suggest that North Korea may have retained seven to eleven kilograms of plutonium, enough for one or two bombs. On February 19, 1992, the two Koreas entered into the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, under which they each agreed not to test, produce, possess, or use nuclear weapons or to possess nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities.
 * NORTH KOREA**
 * Background**

The Agreed Framework In March 1993, after the IAEA called for special inspections under the safeguards agreement, North Korea refused to allow the inspections and announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. The ensuing crisis, which included U.S. consideration of air strikes, ended with the United States and the DPRK signing the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994. Under that agreement, the DPRK agreed: To remain a party to the NPT; and To freeze its plutonium-producing, heavy-water reactor (HWR) program comprising— a 5-megawatt reactor that uses enough uranium fuel to produce a little over 7 kilograms of plutonium annually, enough for at least three nuclear weapons every two years, a facility for separating weapons-grade plutonium from the spent fuel rods, and two much larger, not yet completed reactors that could produce far larger quantities of plutonium. In exchange, the United States agreed to organize a consortium that would build two light water reactors (LWRs)—which do not produce weapons-grade materials—in North Korea and would, pending construction of the LWRs, give North Korea 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the HWR program. Both sides agreed to reduce barriers to trade and investment and to work toward the normalization of relations. In addition, the U.S. promised to give formal assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons; and the DPRK agreed to implement its agreement with South Korea, which it had repudiated, on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Finally, the Agreed Framework required North Korea to come into full compliance with it safeguards agreement with the IAEA only after “a significant portion of the LWR project is completed.” To carry out the LWR construction and oil deliveries, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea created the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization(KEDO) in March 1995. Nine other nations and the European Atomic Energy Community later became KEDO members. However, construction of the LWRs, which originally had a target completion date of 2003, has lagged and is several years behind schedule. In 1997, KEDO changed the estimated completion date to 2007; and experts expect a substantially longer delay. At present, it appears that, upon the insistence of the United States, work on the reactors will likely end in the near future. According to reports, perhaps as early as 1995 or as recently as 2000—the exact date is far from clear — North Korea secretly initiated a uranium enrichment program, in order to produce weapons-grade uranium—highly enriched uranium (HEU). Apparently, it received help from Pakistan, to which North Korea reportedly traded missiles. The uranium enrichment program, though not expressly prohibited by the Agreed Framework, violates the DPRK’s agreement with South Korea on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which the DPRK had pledged in the Agreed Framework to implement. The program also seems to be in violation of the NPT, from which the DPRK had not yet withdrawn while it was developing the program. Much is rightly made of North Korea’s improper efforts to develop an uranium enrichment program that might produce enough highly enriched uranium to make two or more weapons per year by around 2005. However, to give the Agreed Framework its due, it must be noted that the agreement froze operations that by 2003 could have produced enough plutonium for more than 120 weapons. The normalization of relations called for by the Agreed Framework has not occurred; and although U.S. trade barriers were partially lifted in 1995, 1999, and 2000, there is no significant trade between the two countries. Also, the December 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review’s assertion that the U.S. must be prepared to launch a nuclear strike against North Korea in cases of immediate, potential, and unexpected contingencies is difficult to square with the U.S. pledge to give assurances against the threat of such a strike.

2002-2003 Crisis On October 16, 2002, the State Department announced that twelve days earlier, in talks in Pyongyang, the DPRK representative—confronted with evidence that the DPRK had a uranium enrichment program for the production of nuclear weapons—acknowledged that North Korea had such a program. North Korea subsequently denied such an admission. Don Oberdorfer, a journalist who visited the North after the October 16 revelation, stated on November 14 that Pyongyang might not have made such a stark admission. In any event, the term “program” could imply no more than plans to produce HEU or steps to acquire the equipment—gas centrifuges—necessary to enrich uranium to weapons grade. In a November 19, 2002, document provided to Congress, the CIA noted that it had long had suspicions of a North Korean uranium enrichment program but had only recently obtained “clear evidence” that the DPRK had undertaken “to develop a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program about two years ago.” The document also stated that the CIA “recently learned” that the DPRK is building “a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year… as soon as mid-decade.” From October 2002 to the present, the situation with North Korea has generally grown worse. October 25, the DPRK said it would address U.S. concerns if the U.S. signs a non-aggression treaty, guarantees North Korean sovereignty, and does not hinder its economic development. November 14, KEDO announced that it was suspending the delivery of fuel oil because of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program. November 29, the IAEA called on North Korea to open its weapons program to inspections; and on December 4, North Korea rejected the IAEA’s demand. In December, the DPRK announced plans to restart the Yongbyon reactor in order to generate electricity to make up for the cutoff of fuel oil shipments (but experts note that the reactor has little power generating capacity); removed IAEA monitoring equipment from Yongbyon; and expelled IAEA inspectors. January 10, the DPRK announced it was withdrawing from the NPT. February 12, the IAEA declared the DPRK in violation of its safeguards agreement. March 2, four North Korean jet fighters intercepted, but did not shoot at, an unarmed U.S. reconnaissance plane over international waters. April 25, North Korea claimed that it had nearly completed reprocessing of the 8,000 spend fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor, which would yield enough bomb-grade plutonium to build four or five weapons.

Current Diplomatic Efforts Temporarily, in April 2003, the DPRK backed away from its insistence that any talks on the North Korean nuclear situation be bilateral, and the U.S. stopped insisting that they be multilateral. Thus, on April 23, mid-level discussions, moderated by China, were held Beijing. At the Beijing talks, North Korea reportedly claimed that it had begun reprocessing spent fuel rods to produce separated plutonium, which could be used to make nuclear weapons. Also, the North Korean representative, in a side conversation with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, made a vaguely worded claim that North Korea had a nuclear weapon or weapons which, depending on America’s actions, it might test or market. On April 29, the White House rejected a proposal that the DPRK had put forward in Beijing. According to the //New York Times//, “Administration officials said North Korea had asked for a step-by-step package under which it would receive oil shipments, food aid, security guarantees, energy assistance, and economic benefits, among other requests. In return, they said, North Korea had offered to dismantle its nuclear weapons, but only at the end of the process.” The same article quoted Secretary Powell as saying, at an April 29 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, that the DPRK proposal “is not going to take us in the right direction.” Secretary Powell also reportedly added, “We will not be intimidated by their claims and threats. As the president has said, we will not be blackmailed.” Thus, the U.S. rejected the DPRK offer. Nevertheless, the Administration apparently plans to continue to engage with North Korea. The //Times// also quoted White House press secretary Ari Fleischer as saying: “This is the diplomatic process, and the diplomatic process is a long one. The president is going to pursue it at length.”

Potential for Negotiated Settlement If the Administration and the DPRK are committed to seeking a diplomatic solution, there are grounds for believing that although diplomacy will doubtless be arduous, it could succeed. Going into negotiations, if they are indeed conducted, the two sides have staked apparently incompatible stances: the U.S. insists that it will agree to nothing until North Korea verifiably dismantles its nuclear weapons program; the DPRK asserts that it will not do that until after the U.S. has provided all the benefits that the DPRK is seeking. However, these kinds of competing stances are to be expected at the outset of any negotiations. Ultimately, the two sides appear to agree on the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, although the timing of that and the intrusiveness of the inspections necessary to provide adequate verification will undoubtedly pose difficult negotiating challenges. Also, as in most negotiations, phasing the implementation of the benefits each side is to provide, along with agreement as to what those benefits should be, will be the subject of hard bargaining. A bipartisan, six-member congressional delegation, headed by Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), which visited North Korea May 30-June 1, 2003, reported that while the North Koreans stressed that they have nuclear weapons and are building more, they seemed open to a peaceful resolution of the current crisis. Most notably, according to Representative Weldon, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Gue Gwan reacted in a “surprisingly positive” way to an unofficial plan that the Congressman had developed that “relied on strict verification of North Korean compliance.” Congressman Weldon subsequently observed, “We have two choices: isolate North Korea and foolishly hope for its eventual collapse, or take advantage of the window before us and engage North Korea in meaningful dialogue.” That possibility of such a positive North Korean reaction, if genuine, may reflect either a fear of U.S. military action or a realization that the extremely weak North Korean economy badly needs to begin to be integrated into the world economy, which will not occur while the current crisis continues, or some combination of the two. At the outset of negotiations, it would probably make sense for the United States to insist that North Korea verifiably reverse the restarting of its plutonium-producing facilities and freeze both that program and its HEU program. That would be necessary to ensure that while discussions proceed North Korea does not progressively gain an advantage through the continuing production of nuclear weapons or materials. Obtaining that kind of preliminary agreement, similar to the one that enabled the 1994 negotiations to proceed, will probably require providing the North with assurances that its proposals will get fair consideration as the talks progress. A resolution of the current crisis will certainly not be a simple reinstatement of the Agreed Framework. More likely, both sides will be seeking much more than what they were promised in that arrangement. Thus, the U.S. undoubtedly will—and should—insist on a broader, very strict verification regime to provide assurance that North Korea will be unable to circumvent any promises to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs and forego the future development of such a program. Reinstatement of the economic assistance package that was part of the Agreed Framework, or a package along similar lines, would not seem to pose insurmountable obstacles; and some kind of non-aggression assurance seems consistent with Administration disavowals of any aggressive intent. As the United States will be coordinating its position with, and seeking the participation of, North Korea’s neighbors—South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia—their main interests or concerns should be noted: weapons-grade materials or having the capability to do so. China wants (1) to keep a buffer between itself and Japan/South Korea, and (2) avoid economic or military problems in North Korea that could produce an influx of refugees from North Korea. South Korea wants (1) to avoid military actions or economic sanctions that might prompt a North Korean military response, which would risk the lives of millions of South Koreans, (2) avoid the economic harm that a prolonged crisis atmosphere could produce by discouraging foreign investment in South Korea, (3) to put a reconciliation/reunification process back on track; and (4) avoid a precipitous collapse of the DPRK regime, which could put a terrible humanitarian and economic crisis on its doorstep. Japan also wants to avoid a military confrontation in light of the presence of U.S. forces on its soil and the fact that Japan is within reach of North Korean missiles. Russia, the former patron of North Korea, has sought to promote and contribute to a diplomatic solution of the North Korean crisis and may wish to take over the construction of the LWR project. An agreement with the DPRK might either be focused on the nuclear crisis (along with a variety of economic, humanitarian, and security issues that even a narrowly focused negotiation will have to address) or encompass other issues that will have a bearing on important questions of security and stability. Those other issues could include— the continuation and codification of the North’s moratorium on long-range missile testing and sales; adjustments in the deployment and composition of conventional forces on the Korean peninsula that could produce or lead to a relaxation of tensions; addressing North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons (BW) programs; and actions that could further North -South reconciliation. One advantage to broadening the negotiations would be to limit North Korea’s ability to precipitate a future security crisis requiring the new agreement itself to be revisited. The main obstacles to successful negotiations seem to lie in two areas. First, on the North Korean side, if it intends to retain a secret nuclear weapons program, it may reject an adequate inspections and verification regime. Second, if the U.S. is intent on using sanctions or other economic or military pressures to bring about the collapse or capitulation of the North Korean regime, the U.S. might rigidly insist that it will not even begin to negotiate until North Korea has totally and verifiably dismantled its nuclear-weapons capabilities. (If pressures were to “succeed” in bringing about a collapse of the North Korean regime, no one can foresee what might happen during the resulting chaos to any North Korean nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or materials. In that situation, the United States and other nations would face the daunting task of making certain that no desperate efforts to sell them to terrorist groups or “rogue” states succeeded.) Other obstacles include the North’s negotiating style of creating or exacerbating crises in order to exert pressure on anyone across the table; the North’s history of breaking treaty obligations (which will require a particularly intrusive verification regime); and the possibility that the U.S. will try to use time to let international pressures build on the North and force it to capitulate or, at least, weaken its demands. One of the difficulties with the latter option is that in a matter of months, North Korea’s negotiating hand may strengthen dramatically as it produces additional plutonium and then perhaps threatens to sell warheads or materials, tests a nuclear weapon, or mates a nuclear weapon to a delivery system. Finally, there have been reports that the Bush administration may resign itself to the fact that North Korea will have nuclear weapons and materials and concentrate on preventing North Korea from exporting them. That strategy, however, entails both the near impossibility of detecting shipments of even bomb-size quantities of plutonium, no larger that a grapefruit, shielded from detection and hidden in the hulls of large freighters and the difficulty of intercepting jet flights between Pyongyang and, for example, capital cities in the Mid-East. Thus, if such a “containment “ strategy is recognized as futile, the next step could be a preemptive military strike, which could lead to disastrous consequences.
 * All are strongly opposed to North Korea possessing or selling nuclear weapons or
 * All are opposed to UN Security Council consideration of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program at this time, as they believe UN action would just exacerbate the situation.

U.S. Military Options Whether and under what circumstances the United States should use military force are questions that inevitably arise in the context of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The Clinton Administration considered its military options before entering into the Agreed Framework resolving the 1993-94 crisis. In 1999, a Presidential policy review team led by former Secretary of Defense William Perry stressed the importance of avoiding a military conflict, which would likely result in the deaths of “hundred of thousands of persons”— North and South Korean and American military and civilian—and “millions of refugees.” President Bush stated on March 3, 2003, that if U.S. efforts “don’t work diplomatically, they’ll have to work militarily.” Ambassador Robert Gallucci, who was the U.S. negotiator at the 1994 talks that produced the Agreed Framework, has stated that, although negotiations should be pursued, if military force were necessary to prevent North Korean sales of nuclear weapons or materials to al Qaeda, it should be used. There are, however, formidable obstacles to a successful military action against North Korea: We are extremely unlikely to be able to launch an air strike that would eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability. If North Korea has nuclear weapons or plutonium for making them and if it has a uranium-enrichment facility, we probably do not know where any of this is and there is a great chance that they could be in hardened tunnels in mountains. North Korea may also have a secret, hidden facility for reprocessing spent fuel into plutonium. It is impossible to prevent a North Korean retaliatory attack using artillery and missiles, possibly carrying chemical and biological agents, on very heavily populated areas of South Korea. As noted above, such an attack would produce very extensive U.S. and South Korean military casualties along with South Korean and possibly Japanese civilian casualties. Thus, in the words of a senior Bush administration official, although the United States has military options, “we don’t have good ones.”

Chemical and Biological Weapons Concerns over North Korea’s nuclear capability have eclipsed the North’s chemical and biological weapons programs. According to the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies, North Korea has one of the world’s largest chemical warfare stockpiles—possibly between 2,500 and 5,000 tons. The stockpile includes phosgene (choking), hydrogen cyanide (blood), mustard (blister), and sarin (nerve) agents; and North Korea can itself produce all of the foregoing except sarin. Moreover, according to information provided by defectors, its long-range missiles and larger artillery can deliver chemical weapons. Estimates of North Korea’s biological warfare capabilities “can range from North Korea having a rudimentary … program, to actual possession of biological weapons already deployed.” A recent South Korean analysis stated that the North has weaponized one or two agents, which, according to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, may include anthrax and smallpox. On May 6, 2002, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and Disarmament John R. Bolton stated that North Korea has “developed and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents.”

II. Recent Legislation Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-201), appropriating $35 million for KEDO for “administrative expenses and heavy fuel oil costs” under the Agreed Framework. The legislation included various requirements (waivable by the President if required by national security interests) that, before making the funds available for KEDO, the President certify that progress had been made with North Korea regarding nuclear, missile, and certain other issues. This legislation also required the President to name a “North Korea Policy Coordinator” with responsibility to provide “policy direction for negotiations with North Korea” on security issues and “leadership for United States participation in KEDO.” The North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 (subtitle B of title VIII of division A of H.R. 3427, as enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113; appendix G; 113 Stat. 11501A—472; amended by section 1302 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003; Public Law 107-228; 116 Stat. 1350, 1438) prohibits nuclear cooperation with North Korea until the President determines and reports to Congress that North Korea is in compliance with various international agreements prohibiting it from being a nuclear weapons state. The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 (the FY 2003 omnibus appropriations Act) (Public Law 108-7; 117 Stat. 11,175 and 204) made $5 million available for assistance to KEDO for administrative expenses but only if the President “determines that it is vital to the national security interests.” The President’s FY 2004 budget request includes no funds for KEDO. H. Con. Res. 10, introduced by Representative Alcee Hastings, on January 8, 2003, calls on the DPRK to comply with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Agreed Framework, and certain related UN resolutions. S. 145, the North Korea Democracy Act of 2003, introduced by Senator Kyl on January 13, 2003, has seven cosponsors, and (1) prohibits any U.S. aid to North Korea or KEDO under the Agreed Framework; (2) prohibits U.S. nuclear cooperation with North Korea unless the President determines that North Korea is in compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, has given IAEA full access to its nuclear sites, and has taken steps to implement the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization and Congress has approved the cooperation in a joint resolution; (3) authorizes the President to impose full economic sanctions, and to take certain other actions, in response to North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs and violation of its international obligations; and (4) authorizes refugee status for North Koreans seeking to enter the U.S. H.Con.Res.18, introduced by Representative Alcee Hastings on January 28, 2003, calls on the DPRK and the U.S. to return to a specified, interim level of compliance with the Agreed Framework while a more comprehensive bilateral agreement is negotiated. H. Con. Res. 81, introduced by Representative Alcee Hastings, on March 6, 2003, calls on the DPRK to comply with the NPT and the Agreed Framework and refrain from further provocative acts (such as the interception of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft) and calls for an interim level of U.S. compliance with the Agreed Framework. S. Res. 77, introduced by Senator Daschle on March 7, 2003, has 32 cosponsors, and calls on the U.S. to develop a robust nonproliferation strategy including, //inter alia//, engagement in direct and immediate talks with North Korea, coordinated with U.S. regional allies, to end the nuclear and long-range missile programs of North Korea. Section 1413 of H.R. 1950, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005, introduced by the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the International Relations Committee (Messrs. Hyde and Lantos, respectively) and Rep. Berman on May 5, 2003, and reported by the Committee on May 16, 2003, expresses the sense of the Congress that the U.S. should introduce a UN Security Council resolution prohibiting UN members from acquiring, and authorizing the interdiction and seizure of, missiles and related equipment and technology from North Korea.

III. Obstacles Going into negotiations, the two sides have staked apparently incompatible stances: the U.S. insisting that it will agree to nothing until North Korea dismantles its nuclear weapons program, and the DPRK asserting that it will not do that until after the U.S. has provided all the benefits that the DPRK is seeking. However, it must be kept in mind that the two sides ultimately agree on the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, although the timing of that, and the means for verifying it, will undoubtedly pose a difficult negotiating challenge. If North Korea does not intend in good faith to disband its nuclear weapons programs, it may reject an adequate inspections and verification regime. If the U.S. is intent on using sanctions or other economic pressures either to coerce the DPRK to shut down those programs or to cause the downfall of the North Korean regime, the U.S. might rigidly insist that it will not even begin to negotiate until North Korea has totally and verifiably dismantled its nuclear weapons facilities and relinquished whatever nuclear weapons and materials it has in its possession. North Korea might insist on a bilateral non-aggression pact, with South North excluded, under which the U.S. would withdraw from the Korean peninsula. North Korea is likely to use confrontational and provocative tactics throughout any negotiations.

IV. Q & A Q. How quickly can North Korea build a stockpile of weapons-grade nuclear materials? A. According to the CIA, North Korea already has enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons. The spent fuel rods in Yongbyon contain enough plutonium for about five nuclear weapons; and North Korea could separate the plutonium from the rods by about June 2003. If the Yongbyon 5-megawatt reactor has been restarted, which could have occurred by February 2003, it could produce enough plutonium for about three weapons every two years. If North Korea were to complete construction of the 50-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon, which would take about two years, that reactor would produce enough plutonium for about 11 weapons annually. The 200-megawatt reactor in Taechon is several years from completion, at which point it could produce enough plutonium for 44 weapons per year. Thus, the North Korean plutonium stockpile might be amassed as follows:

Late 2003: 6-7 nuclear weapons.

Late 2005 (allowing five months for processing the 5-megawatt reactor’s fuel rods after it operates for two years): 9-10 nuclear weapons.

Late 2006 (assuming the 50-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon is completed in 2005): 20-21 nuclear weapons.

Late 2007: 34-35 nuclear weapons.

Late 2008: 44-45 nuclear weapons.

If the Taechon 200-megawatt reactor is built by 2008, the stockpile would grow by at least 56 nuclear-weapons worth of plutonium each year thereafter.

These computations do not include the HEU that North Korea may have the ability to produce because too little is known about the status of that program, and it may be so small as not to increase the dynamics that these numbers present.

Q. Why should the U.S. enter into negotiations with North Korea? Wouldn’t doing so simply reward it for bad behavior? A. Successful negotiations resulting in the verifiable dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear weapons programs are clearly in our national security interests. If those programs remain intact, North Korea will soon be able to export to terrorists and states hostile to the United States nuclear weapons or weapons-grade materials and the long-range means to deliver such weapons. Moreover, it could use its own nuclear and missile capabilities to threaten its Northeast Asia neighbors. As Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, stated at a hearing on March 6, 2003, “While some American analysts oppose any dialogue with North Korea, especially in the wake of extraordinarily provocative events, I do not believe we have the luxury to be this absolute. The risks are too immediate and the stakes are too high.”

Q. Does the U.S. have a military option for destroying North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs? A. A U.S. air attack would be unlikely to destroy either North Korea’s nuclear weapons, any existing stores of plutonium, its uranium enrichment program, nuclear delivery systems, or its hundreds of long-range artillery pieces that could destroy Seoul because we do not know where all of these items, facilities, and installations are located; some are undoubtedly hidden in deep tunnels in mountains; and some missiles may be on mobile launchers. The U.S. could ultimately win a war with North Korea, but likely at a cost of hundreds of thousands of U.S. and South Korean military personnel and South Korean and possibly Japanese civilians and U.S. civilians living in South Korea. Moreover, neither Russia, China, Japan, nor South Korea has indicated any support for the possibility of a military attack as a solution.

Also, it would seem very difficult for the U.S. military to find and secure North Korea’s nuclear and other WMD and materials before those with custody of them had the opportunity to sell some to terrorists or “rogue” states.

Q. Why should we make an agreement that North Korea is almost certain to violate? A. Obviously, we should not. The challenge is to shape any agreement with the DPRK in such a way as to make the inspections regime sufficiently rigorous and intrusive as to severely limit any opportunity for cheating. The patience and strength that this will require cannot be overstated, but the alternative to success—a nuclear-armed North with nuclear weapons and materials to sell—would be a potentially tragic setback.

Q. It has been suggested that we ought to accept the fact that North Korea has a nuclear weapons capability that we cannot realistically and reliably eradicate. Thus, we should walk away from negotiations and “manage” the situation through some kind of quarantine and interdiction effort. Is that a satisfactory solution? A. No, such an effort would be futile because it would be impossible to learn of, detect, and prevent the export of the small amounts of plutonium or highly enriched uranium needed to build a nuclear weapon. Such a shipment might be via a North Korean jetliner or in a shielded package aboard a freighter. Also, this approach would leave the U.S. and our allies open to a future North Korean nuclear-blackmail crisis. Moreover, acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea would greatly weaken the nonproliferation regime by forcing South Korea and Japan to consider acquiring nuclear arms.

Q. Should a settlement of the current crisis encompass North Korea’s long-range missiles, its biological and chemical weapons, and its conventional arms? A: Ideally, an effective agreement would deal with those troublesome aspects of the North’s arms programs in such a way as to remove the North Korea’s ability to precipitate new crises in the future. But those objectives should not be pursued at this time if they would hinder the efforts to reach agreement on the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs.

V. Talking Points A nuclear-armed North Korea is intolerable and inconsistent with our national interest. Also, it is clear that the costs of attempting to use military force to disarm North Korea would far outweigh the benefits. The only realistic option at present is a negotiated agreement that ensures a nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula. Reaching an enforceable agreement with North Korea that precludes its emergence as a nuclear power will require a willingness to engage in tough, protracted negotiations with a country inclined to use bluster and the creation of a crisis atmosphere to press its demands. Time is not on our side. In the next several months, North Korea could go from a country with one or two nuclear weapons to a country with six or seven and have the potential to climb to nine or ten in two years and dozens upon dozens in five years. That means it could increasingly develop the options of testing weapons, of selling them to other countries or to terrorist groups, and of threatening South Korea and Japan. Moreover, wars often start as a result of error or miscalculation during times of crisis or tension. It is time we got talks going in earnest and thereby lower the risks of a calamity. A tough negotiating posture, worked out with and supported by other countries in Northeast Asia—South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia—may be necessary to put North Korea in a realistic frame of mind. However, a unilateral U.S. policy of confronting North Korea would risk exacerbating the nuclear situation, leaving the world with a nuclear-armed North Korea, and impairing our relations with countries who are important to us both in this region and globally. We have three basic options: an aggressive, determined diplomatic strategy; accepting a robust North Korean nuclear weapons program and North Korea’s marketing of nuclear weapons or materials; or conducting a full-scale war, which would likely result in hundreds of thousands of deaths, to eliminate that program. Those who spurn negotiations in favor of building pressure on North Korea in order to bring about a regime change must answer these questions: During the collapse of the current regime, how can we make certain that North Korea’s nuclear and other weapons and materials of mass destruction remain in place and out of the hands of terrorists or “rogue” states until those weapons and materials are safely secured? How will the United States be able to make certain that, when there is a new regime, those weapons and materials will be safely secured and dismantled? Until there are good answers to these questions, sanctions or other pressures that might bring about the collapse of current North Korean government would make the United States less, not more, secure.

VI. Factoids North Korea probably has one or two nuclear weapons (or the separated plutonium for building them) and could have seven by the summer of 2003, ten by July 2005, and 45 by July 2008. If and when it finishes building a 200-megawatt reactor (perhaps by 2008), its stockpile of bomb-grade plutonium could grow at the rate of 56 new bombs worth each year. This does not count North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program, which the CIA says might be able to produce enough HEU for two or more weapons per year by around 2005.

Comparing North and South Korea:

Land mass: North 120,540 square kilometers; South 98,190 square kilometers.

Population: North 22.2 million; South 48.3 million.

GDP: North $22 billion/$1,000 per capita; South $931 billion/$19,400 per capita.

Exports: North $0.83 billion; South $159.2 billion.

Imports: North $1.9 billion; South; $146.6 billion

Total military spending: North $5.1 billion; South $12.8 billion.

Military spending as percentage of GDP: North 31.3%; South 2.8%.

Armies (active-duty personnel): North 930,000; South; 575,000.

Tanks: North, 3,500; South 1,560.

Field artillery pieces: North, 7,800; South 4,200.

Multiple rocket launchers: North 2,500; South, 140.

North Korea’s 500 hundred 170mm artillery pieces and 200 multiple-launch rocket systems could hit Seoul with artillery shells and chemical weapons.

North Korea could hit Japan with 100 No-dong missiles.

The DPRK agreed to a long-range-missile flight moratorium in September 1999 and has continued to observe it.

VII. Applicable Treaties, Legislation, and Other International Agreements

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (commonly known as the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT))

Agreement of January 30, 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, signed on January 20, 1992, and entered into force on February 19, 1992, in which the two Koreas agreed not to make, test, possess, or use nuclear weapons or to “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.”

Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

See the Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001,” accessed at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2002.htm#5 ; and the November 19, 2002, CIA estimate provided to Congress, accessed at []. North Korea apparently produced the plutonium before 1992 and concealed it from IAEA inspectors.

See Monterey Institute, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “North Korea Country Profile,” May 2003, accessed at [] ; and David Albright, “North Korea’s Current and Future Plutonium and Nuclear Weapon Stocks,” Institute for Science and International Security Issue Brief, January 15, 2003, accessed at []. Some dismiss the North Korean claim of having weaponized the plutonium as an attempt either to deter American military action against it or to bolster its bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States.

See, //e.g.//, Joseph Kahn, “North Korea May Be Angering Its Only Ally,” //New York Times//, April 26, 2003, accessed at [] ; and Don Kirk, “Disparate Views Emerge Over North Korean Nuclear Strength,” //New York Times,// June 2, 2003, accessed at [].

Albright, //op.cit.//, note 1; Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “Beyond the Agreed Framework: The DPRK’s Projected Atomic Bomb Making Capabilities, 2002-09,” //Analysis//, December 3, 2002, accessed at [].

The fuel rods from North Korea’s 5-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon probably contain about 27 kilograms of plutonium, which could be extracted in order to manufacture a nuclear weapon. The DPRK claims to be moving ahead with the reprocessing work necessary to extract the plutonium.

See Global Security Newswire, “North Korea: Pyongyang Threatens to Export Nuclear Weapons; Claims Fuel Rod Reprocessing Nearly Complete,” April 25, 2003, accessed at []. Assuming North Korea can build a nuclear weapon with 5 kilograms of plutonium, that is enough for five weapons.

See Albright, //op. cit.,// note 1.; Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “Beyond the Agreed Framework: The DPRK's Projected Atomic Bomb Making Capabilities, 2002-09” Analysis, December 3, 2002, accessed at [].

A CIA estimate provided to Congress on November 19, 2002, stated that North Korea had “embarked on an effort to develop a centrifuge–based uranium enrichment program about two years ago” and that a plant then under construction “could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational—which could be as soon as mid-decade.” This document can be accessed at [].

A list of signatories can be accessed at [].

Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, accessed at [].

See Albright, //op. cit.,// note 1.

Accessed at [].

Arms Control Association, “Chronology of U.S.- North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Fact Sheet, accessed at [].

William J. Perry, “Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Implications for U.S. Policy in Northeast Asia,” Speech given at Center of International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University and at the Brookings Institution, January 2003, accessed at [].

The text of the Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea can be accessed at [].

See the description of KEDO’s history at the KEDO website: [].

November 19, 2002, CIA document provided to Congress, accessed at [] ; and Larry Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress, p. 10 (updated March 17, 2003).

Global Security Newswire, “North Korea: U.S. Ambassador Says Reactor Work Probably Will Stop,” June 27, 2003, accessed at [].

See Dipali Mukhopadhyay and Jon Wolfsthal, “Ten Questions on North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Program,” January 7, 2003, accessed at [] . Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korea Profile: Nuclear Overview,” accessed at  [] ; Seymour Hersh, “The Cold Test,” //The New Yorker//, January 27, 2003, accessed at http://foi.missouri.edu/terrorbkgd/coldtest.html; and David Sanger and James Dao, “U.S. Says Pakistan Gave (Nuclear) Technology to North Korea,” //New York Times//, October 18, 2002, accessed at  [].

See the November 19, 2002, Central Intelligence Agency document provided to the Congress, accessed at [].

The spent fuel rods at Yongbyon could have produced enough plutonium for five weapons. The 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon could have produced enough spent fuel to yield enough plutonium for one and a half weapons per year for eight years; and two larger reactor projects could, upon completion, have produced enough plutonium for 11 weapons per year for six years and 44 weapons per year for at least one year, respectively. See Albright, //op. cit.,// note 1.

See excerpts from the Nuclear Posture Review published by the GlobalSecurity.org, accessed at [].

Press Statement, Richard Boucher, U.S. State Department Spokesperson, accessed at [].

According to Oberdorfer, North Korean officials informed him that an October 25 KCNA statement contains the exact words Kang used during his meeting with Kelly, which the United States interpreted as an admission of a uranium-enrichment program. The relevant portion of that statement reads, “The D.P.R.K. made itself very clear…that the D.P.R.K. was entitled to possess not only nuclear weapon but any type of weapon more powerful than that so as to defend its sovereignty and right to existence.” See Paul Kerr, “ KEDO Suspends Oil Shipments to North Korea,” Arms Control Today, December 2002, accessed at [].

This is noted in Leon Sigal, “North Korea Is No Iraq: Pyongyang’s Negotiating Strategy,” Arms Control Today, December 2002, pp. 8, 11. Accessed at: [].

Reuters, “Chronology of Nuclear Diplomacy on North Korea,” //Hindustan Times//, December 31, 2002, accessed at [].

Although North Korea said it was restarting the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon to generate electricity, that reactor has never been connected to the North Korean power grid, and the amount of electricity that it could produce is not significant. Daniel Pinkston, “North Korea Lifts the Freeze on its Nuclear Program,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, accessed at  [] ; Niksch, //op. cit.,// note 14, p. 5 (“Satellite photographs reportedly also show that the atomic reactors have no attached power lines ….”).

Reuters, //op. cit.,// note 25.

Associated Press, “Interception of U.S. Spy Plane Raises Nuclear Tension,” March 4, 2003, accessed at [].

Global Security Newswire, “North Korea: Pyongyang Threatens to Export Nuclear Weapons; Claims Fuel Rod Reprocessing Nearly Complete,” April 25, 2003, accessed at [].

The reasons why the U.S. insists on multilateral talks and North Korea, on bilateral talks are difficult to discern. North Korea probably desires bilateral talks because it does not want to be in negotiations with five or so countries, all of whom condemn North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and who it fears would “gang up” on them. Also, in bilateral talks, North Korea would be likely to seek a non-aggression pact with the U.S. alone, leaving out South Korea, in exchange for dismantling its nuclear weapons program, and providing for any verification to be performed by the U.S. alone. If such a deal were struck, the United States could be left on its own to enforce it if North Korea were to renege. See Jonathan Rauch, “Not a Shortcut, But an Ambush,” //Resasononline//, March 17, 2003, accessed at []. Of course, the idea that the United States would agree to such an unwise, disadvantageous arrangement just because the talks are bilateral strains credulity. The United States apparently wishes to have the regional powers involved in any talks so that they can help convince North Korea to back down from its nuclear ambitions and will be part of, and thus have a direct stake in enforcing, any new agreement. At a March 12, 2003, hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chairman Richard Lugar stated, “[I]t is vital that the United States be open to bilateral diplomatic opportunities that could be useful in reversing North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs and in promoting stability.” Senator Lugar’s statement can be accessed at [].

The U.S. delegation was headed by Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly; the DPRK delegation, by a Deputy Foreign Minister, Li Gun. David E. Sanger, “North Korea Says It Now Possesses Nuclear Arsenal,” //New York Times//, April 24, 2003, accessed at [].

U.S. officials quoted the DPRK representative, Li Gun, as having said, “We can’t dismantle them. It’s up to you whether we do a physical demonstration or transfer them.” Global Security Newswire, “North Korea: Pyongyang Threatens to Export Nuclear Weapons; Claims Fuel Rod Reprocessing Nearly Complete,” April 25, 2003, accessed at [].

Joel Brinkley, “U.S. Rejects North Korea Proposal on Nuclear Weapons,” //New York Times,// April 29, 2003, accessed at [|http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/29/international/asia/29CND- KOREA.html].

For detailed recommendations as to how negotiations might proceed and the roles of China, South Korea, Japan and Russia, see the report of the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy, “Turning Point in Korea: New Opportunities and New Dangers,” cosponsored by the Center for International Policy and the Center for East Asia Studies of the University of Chicago, Selig S. Harrison, Chairman, February 2003, accessed at []; James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, “How to Deal With North Korea,” //Foreign Affairs,// Mar./Apr. 2003, p. 16; Alan D. Romberg and Michael D. Swaine, “The North Korea Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for Negotiation,” //Arms Control Today//, May 2003, pp. 4-6, accessed at [] ; and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “A ‘Master Plan’ to Deal with North Korea,” Policy Brief #114, The Brookings Institution, January 2003, accessed at  [].

David McGlinchey, “North Korea I: Lawmakers Say North Korea Ready to Talk,” //Global Security Newswire//, June 13, 2003, accessed at [].

Rep. Curt Weldon, “A 10-point plan for N. Korea,” //Philadelphia Inquirer,// June 30, 2003, accessed at []. Rep. Weldon’s column is summarized in David McGlinchey, “North Korea I: Weldon Details Plan To Resolve North Korean Crisis,” //Global Security Newswire//, June 30, 2003, accessed at  [].

This was suggested by Ambassador Robert Gallucci at the May 7, 2003 Arms Control Association briefing, “The North Korean Crisis: What’s Next,” accessed at []. Ambassador Gallucci, who headed the U.S. side of the 1994 talks with North Korea, noted that essentially that kind of no-ongoing-advantage-while-we-talk position was achieved at the outset of the 1994 talks. Much the same point is made by Romberg and Swaine, //op. cit.,// note 40.

For a discussion of the technical aspects and challenges of verification, see Jon. B. Wolfsthal, Fred McGoldrick, and Seongwhun Cheon, “Verifying North Korean Nuclear Disarmament, A Technical Analysis,” //Working Papers//, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, No. 38, June 2003, accessed at [].

For example, on January 6, 2003, President Bush stated, “We have no intention of invading North Korea.” David E. Sanger, “Bush Welcomes Slower Approach on North Korea,” //New York Times//, January 7, 2003; and on January 27, 2003, President Bush stated, “We have no aggressive intent, no argument with the North Korean people. We're interested in peace on the Korean Peninsula.” The latter quote can be accessed at [].

This was suggested by The Honourable Maurice F. Strong, Special Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at a June 18, 2003, event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. See David McGlinchey, “North Korea I: Chaos Could Follow North Korean Regime Change, UN Envoy Says,” //Global Security Newswire//, June 18, 2003, accessed at [].

See Victor Cha, “Mr. Kim Has Our Attention. But He Won't Be Able to Keep It,” //Washington Post//, May 4, 2003, accessed at [].

Philip Saunders, “Confronting Ambiguity: How To Handle North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” //Arms Control Today//, March 2003, pp. 11, 15.

David E. Sanger, “Aftereffects: The Asian Arena: Bush Shifts Focus to Nuclear Sales by North Korea,” //New York Times,// May 5, 2003.

William J. Perry, //op. cit.//, note 10.

William J. Perry, “Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations,” Unclassified Report of North Korea Policy Review, October 12, 1999, accessed at [].

Quoted in Michael Levi, “Off Target,” //The New Republic,// March 24, 2003.

Arms Control Association Press Briefing, “The North Korean Crisis: What’s Next?” May 7, 2003, accessed at [].

Philip C. Saunders, “Military Options for Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” //North Korea// //Special Collection,//Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, January 27, 2003, accessed at [].

“North Korea Profile: Chemical Overview,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, prepared for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed at [].

“North Korea Profile: Biological Weapons Overview,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, prepared for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed at [].

Department of State, Bureau of Resources Management, “Summary and Highlights, International Affairs Function 150,request for the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs,” accessed at [].

See Niksch, //op. cit.,// note 14.

See Albright, //op. cit.,// note 1; Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, //op. cit.,// note 2.

Accessed at [].

South Korea, which could suffer casualties in the hundreds of thousands, strongly opposes military action. See, //e.g.,// Sang-Hun Choe, “S. Korea Leader, Bush To Discuss N. Korea,” //Washington Times,// May 6, 2003; Philip C. Saunders, //op. cit.,// note 44; and Monterey Institute, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “WMD 411: North Korea,” prepared for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed at []. It should also be kept in mind that U.S. military action could produce a missile attack on Japan where the U.S. has military installations and could result in a refugee crisis along the North Korea -China border.

Romberg and Swaine, //op. cit.,// note 40.

See Task Force on U.S Korea Policy, //op. cit.,// note 40.

This is adapted from William J. Perry, //op. cit.//, note 10.

All comparative facts up to this point are from the Central Intelligence Agency’s “The World Factbook 2002,” accessed for North Korea at [] and for South Korea at  [].

Facts below footnote 73 are from the Federation of American Scientists website, “Orders of Battle and Major Equipment: Ground Forces of South Korea and North Korea, 1990,” accessed at [].

Philip C. Saunders, //op. cit.//, note 48.

BBC News, “Japan Questions N Korea Deal,” March 19, 2003, accessed at [].

Accessed at [].

Accessed at [].

Accessed at [].

Accessed at [].